This article presents the first survey of the full range of diplomatic interactions between the Mughal Empire and the English and Dutch East India Companies (EIC and VOC) in the period 1608-1717. It proposes a typology of the six different modes of diplomacy practiced by the EIC and VOC as a means to better understand the distinct nature of corporate diplomacy. Moving its focus beyond exceptional embassies, this article demonstrates that by far the most common forms of Company diplomatic activity consisted of low-profile petitioning at the imperial centre and ongoing political interactions with provincial and local power-holders. It draws on circa fifty distinct episodes to chart how Dutch and English diplomatic repertoires in South Asia took shape in response to local demands and conventions. Both Companies petitioned Mughal emperors in much the same
way as Indian subjects did, and both relied on Mughal patrons to do so. Cast in the role of supplicants seeking imperial favour and protection, Company-envoys presented themselves as obliging participants in the ceremonial performance of an asymmetrical relationship. By tying commercial privileges to expectations of submission and service, the imperial government proceeded to incorporate these foreign actors into a domestic political framework.
In the literature on early modern global interactions, few episodes have received more sustained attention than the diplomatic encounter between Nur-ud-Din Muhammad Jahangir DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 2 (1569-1627), fourth emperor of the Mughal dynasty in India (r. , and the Jacobean courtier and royal ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe (c. 1581-1644). 1 Over time, this first English embassy to India has come to signify many different things to many different readersits meanings hotly contested, yet its centrality to early modern Asian-European contacts virtually unquestioned. 2 Whilst providing fertile ground for key debates in global history, the enduring scholarly fascination with Roe's reception at Jahangir's court has served to privilege this unique encounter over many other, less well-known but far more representative, encounters.
As such, the focus on Roe's embassy has severely limited our understanding of European diplomacy in Mughal South Asia as a whole. 3 This article seeks to redress the historiographical imbalance by providing the first survey of the full range of diplomatic relations between the Mughal state and the two leading European commercial enterprises in seventeenth-century Asia, the English and Dutch East India Companies (EIC and VOC). It studies these organisations in conjunction to bring out correspondences between English and Dutch diplomatic activities in Mughal domains, and by doing so traces the outlines of a distinct type of East India Company diplomacy.
As a royal mission aimed at brokering 'Articles of treaty on equall tearmes' between the English and Mughal sovereigns, Roe's embassy was far from successful. 4 However, as a seminal text from the opening phase of Anglo-Indian encounters, the journal Roe kept during his stay at Jahangir's court has turned into a classic reference point for historians and literary critics interested in early modern global connections, cross-cultural communication, and early Orientalism. As manifestations of England's first ambitious foray into India, Roe's mission and writings have been seen to exemplify early English imperial desire as well as England's marginal place in seventeenth-century Asia. 5 It has also inspired arguments about the presumed incommensurability of European and Indian court cultures, as well as about the relative success of cross-cultural understanding and cultural translation. 6 DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 3 These are foundational debates which have expanded the critical vocabulary of diplomatic history in general. 7 Even so, as a testing ground for the meta-narratives that have been constructed partly on its basis, Roe's mission is both limited in scope and problematic in nature. When set against the entire range of East India Company diplomacy, it becomes apparent that not just the ambassador's unyielding engagement with the Mughal diplomatic world, but the very form of his embassy was atypical. Cut down to size, Roe's mission stands out mainly for highlighting the differences between royal diplomacy on the one hand, and the activity in South Asia prior to the mid-eighteenth century has been limited to brief comments in standard works. 9 Indicative is that a recent overview of 'Diplomacy in India, 1526-1858' is almost exclusively concerned with the 1750s onwards, leaving readers interested in EIC diplomacy in the long century following Roe's embassy chiefly dependent on archival publications by William Foster and others. 10 Research on VOC diplomacy has been more abundant, particularly in recent years. 11 Nevertheless, with the exception of two essays on Joannes Bacherus and scattered remarks concerning Dutch representatives at the court of Shah Jahan (r. 1628-57), analyses of Dutch diplomatic activity in the Mughal Empire have only focused on the two best-known instances: the splendid embassies of Dircq van Adrichem (1662) and Joan Josua Ketelaar (1711-13). 12 Above all, very few attempts have DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 4 been made to situate these exceptional moments within the longer history of political interactions between the Companies and the Mughal government. 13 By doing just that, this article hopes to demonstrate that it was not the sporadic dispatch of stately missions, but periodic low-profile representations at the imperial centre combined with continuous political exchanges and negotiations with local and regional power-holders, that constituted the norm in early modern Mughal-European diplomacy. Based on circa fifty distinct diplomatic eventscomprising all known Dutch and English representations at the imperial court from 1608 to 1717, plus a representative sample from the much larger set of negotiations at sub-imperial levelsthis article charts how Dutch and English Company agents, Mughal noblemen, Indian brokers, and other intermediaries used a diverse range of formal and informal approaches to insert the newcomers into the Mughal political landscape.
The combined evidence from dozens of diplomatic episodesmany of which have not been studied beforeconclusively dispels the notion that Mughal-European exchanges were hampered by the so-called "incommensurability" of diplomatic cultures. 14 15 Whilst their importance is increasingly noted as a result of the growing interest in the participation of 'non-state' and 'sub-state' actors in inter-polity relations, the specific nature of corporate diplomacy has so far remained underexplored. 16 Recent scholarship has recognized that modern definitions of diplomacy as the conduct of relations between territorially-bounded sovereign states are unsuited to understanding the pluriform landscape of early modern political entities engaged in cross-border exchanges. 17 A period in which the rules and boundaries of diplomacy were far from stable or universally agreed, the early modern world was also characterized by imperial formations within which 'the line between internal supplication and foreign relations is difficult, if [not] impossible to draw.' 18 Indeed, as is DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 6 best-documented in the Ottoman context, rights of political representation on behalf of external powers (that is, diplomatic duties) were frequently invested in officials (consuls, bailos, or directors of trading factories) who doubled as heads of small ethnic communities of resident foreign merchants seen by their host states as 'one of myriad communities…living within the polity'. 19 Hence, just as scholars regard English and Dutch diplomacy in Istanbul in terms of lobbying the Ottoman authorities for commercial freedoms and legal protection, corporation was in a position to submit itself to a foreign state', and 'could offer obeisance' or 'fealty' to such states as a precondition for receiving much-coveted commercial privileges. 26 The most manifest case was arguably that of Japan, where the Dutch 'deliberately positioned themselves as loyal subordinates intent on taking up their place alongside the shogun's domestic vassals'. 27 Such unequal relationships were both expressed by and constituted through diplomatic practice. As Rudi Matthee has noted in relation to Persia, Company representatives at Asian courts were routinely compelled to partake in highly asymmetric rituals that were 'structured in visions of royal sovereignty, patronage, and benevolence mirrored in obligations of deference, subordination and tribute'. 28 This description applies to Mughal India in equal measure. It was only in the later eighteenth century that a 'Mughal-centred' system of diplomatic relationships, ceremonies, and hierarchies gave way to 'Company-centred diplomacy', and even then not without a degree of 'mimicking Indo-Persianate diplomacy and culture'. 29 Until then, European parties seeking advantageous trade had little choice but to acknowledge the emperor's supreme authority and accept being incorporated into the existing configuration of power.
What enabled the East India Companies to do so on their own accord was the fact that they enjoyed the right to wage war, conclude alliances, or otherwise establish political relationships with rulers within their designated area of operations, as set down in successive charters granted by their home authorities. 30 Hence, with the notable exception of Roe and Norris, each of the men who during this period conducted EIC or VOC diplomacy in Mughal India was commissioned solely by the Company they served, not the English Crown or the Dutch States-General. 31 This crucial circumstance allowed these merchant-envoys substantial leeway to adjust to the norms and practices of Mughal diplomacy, which practically all of them did to a remarkable degree. As foreign merchant communities, the Dutch and English derived the right to trade and reside in Mughal domains from a variety of written orders DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 8 (farmans, nishans, and parwanas) issued by successive Mughal governments. This arrangement was framed within a vision of imperial sovereignty, as is evident from the wording of decrees. The Dutch traders, a farman by Shah Jahan tells us in the VOC's contemporary translation, 'enter under my shadow and protection' and were expected to strive 'obediently and willingly' towards the well-being of the empire. 32 Similar rhetoric is found in a number of farmans which Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707) issued to the English. 'Doe the King acceptable service and expect a reward', one of them urged, while a later one stated that the EIC had 'made a most Humble Submissive Petition', and 'Sent their Vakkeels
[agents] to the Heavenly Palace the most illustrious in the world, to get the Royall Favour'. 33 Far from mutually-binding treaties, such documents were unilateral directives from emperors to their subordinates, expressing a vertical relationship of protection and vassalage. 34 The main reason that the Mughal administration was quick to extend its favour was that foreign trade generated substantial tax income and a welcome supply of precious metals. In addition, the relationships they struck up with the various groups of Europeans enabled them to keep a check on the potentially disruptive impact of these armed traders, while seeking to benefit from their access to foreign luxury goods and military potential. 35 As for the Companies, their objectives were to enjoy free access to cotton, silk, indigo, and other commodities; obtain exemption from or reductions in customs duties and road tolls; and retain the right to try their own people and freely practice their religion. 36 The various modes of diplomacy they practiced were uniformly geared towards the extension or renewal of such privileges, the confirmation of extraterritorial rights, and obtaining redress against highhanded treatment by Mughal administrators or the non-observance of previous decrees. Cast in the role of humble supplicants seeking favourable commands by the courts that received them, English and Dutch representatives petitioned Mughal emperors and their viceroys in much the same way as the empire's Indian subjects did. Just how much these conclusions DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 9 modify received wisdom based on the paradigmatic example of Roe's embassy becomes clear when placing this exceptional mission in context.
II
Organized by the East India Company and accredited by King James I, England's first formal diplomatic engagement with South Asia was aimed at securing a firm foundation for English trade in the Mughal Empire through mutually-binding agreements. 37 The unfeasible nature of this objective became apparent soon after Roe landed in Surat, and before long his letters home featured bitter complaints laying bare the mismatch between English means and expectations and the demands and conventions of Mughal imperial culture. 38 Instructed to uphold James's honour, Roe's comportment in India was informed by contemporary European diplomatic theory, above all the notion that ambassadors represented their sovereign in person. 39 This guiding principle underpinned Roe's persistent protests against what he regarded as 'affronts and slauish Customes', most famously the symbolic acts of submission to imperial authority expected of those attending the Mughal court, manifested in ritual prostrations and the donning of honorific robes (khil'at). 40 Although he quickly became aware that different diplomatic conventions prevailed in the Indo-Persian world, the ambassador felt duty-bound to those concepts he shared with his royal master, repeatedly insisting on their universality as part of the 'law of Nations' when interacting with Mughal officials. 41 Caught between the conflicting needs of representing his king and furthering the interest of a fledgling corporation, Roe was ill-equipped to deal with a ruler who signed unilateral commands instead of bilateral treaties; a diplomatic tradition that did not acknowledge European standards as universally applicable; and a court whose standards of royal largesse made his modest gifts look painfully scant. 42 
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Several of these issues also dogged the only other royal ambassador sent from England to the Mughal court, Sir William Norris (c. 1657-1702). Tasked with soliciting fresh farmans confirming the right of English subjects to trade and reside in Mughal domains under favourable conditions, Norris arrived in India in September 1699 to act on behalf of the socalled "New" East India Company, founded the previous year to replace the existing or "Old" Company although eventually merging with the former in 1708. 43 Commissioned by William III and carrying the king's letter to the aged emperor Aurangzeb, Norris acted as a conduit for the establishment of 'Perpetuall Friendship' and 'mutuall love' between two monarchs from different ends of Eurasia; a move which paralleled James I's efforts to fashion a discourse of mutuality in his epistolary exchange with Jahangir. 44 Further parallels existed in the way both Roe and Norris appealed to universal notions. Gesturing towards the Ottoman court to support his claim, Roe had sought to convince his Mughal interlocutors that 'the honnor and qualety of an ambassador is not ruled by the customes of England, but the consent of all the world'. 45 Ambassadours wch was secured all ye world over'. 46 Even if these particular arguments carried little weight in the Mughal context, it is evident that the imperial administration recognized European monarchs as valid diplomatic partners and sought to accommodate the differences between their respective diplomatic cultures to some degree. Thus, both Jahangir and Aurangzeb authored replies to the royal letters received from England, and both reportedly allowed the English ambassadors to do reverence after their 'owne Custome'. 47 Most importantly, Aurangzeb's reception of Norris in April 1701 was preceded by detailed negotiations about points of diplomatic ceremony DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 11 carried out between the ambassador and two of the highest Mughal dignitaries, Asad Khan and Ruhullah Khan, the imperial wazir (chief minister) and khan-i-saman (head of the imperial household), respectively. 48 Insisting on points of European diplomatic protocol, and commenting that the Mughals were 'strangers to all Customes of yt nature in Europe, havinge had none of my character here these 100 yeares', it is clear that both Norris and his interlocutors viewed his embassy as qualitatively different from the ongoing political interactions between the Mughal state and the EIC's representatives in India. 49 Norris cited the precedent of Roe's reception, and demanded that his rank be acknowledged through the highest possible diplomatic honours. 50 Conversely, Mughal officials showed interest in European politics and courtly customs, quizzing Norris about a range of issues relevant to his audience, including whether ambassadors in Europe where allowed to sit in a monarch's presence and keep their hats on. 51 Whilst the status and formality attached to the office of ambassador limited royal envoys in making concessionsas the rigidity regarding protocol displayed by both Roe and Norris revealsthe greater prestige connected with royal embassies also induced the Mughals to allow greater degrees of reciprocity. 52 It are these two aspects that most clearly set royal embassies apart from other forms of East India Company diplomacynot the size of embassy trains, the value of diplomatic gifts, or their commercial and political aims. Both responses followed from a shared sense that these embassies existed within a global sphere of inter-dynastic exchange. 53 Yet royal missions were the eye-catching exceptions to the norm.
As becomes clear when broadening the scope of research, the vast bulk of what constituted
East India Company diplomacy in Mughal India was concerned not so much with representing far-flung sovereigns, but with cultivating relationships of political patronage in what was essentially a domestic, South Asian setting.
III
On the face of it, there is very little that unites the diplomatic missions of Marcus Oldenburgh (1633) and Joan Josua Ketelaar (1711-13). The first Dutch deputation to the Mughal court about which we are reasonably well-informed, Oldenburgh's dispatch to Agra is a typical example of the low-key, small-scale petitioning at the imperial centre routinely practiced by the VOC. 54 Accompanied by just one colleague, Oldenburgh was explicitly instructed not to use the high-sounding title of 'ambassador', but instead to introduce himself as a commissioned agent (expresse gecommitteerde). He was also strictly ordered not to exceed his tight budget, whether by extending his retinue, disbursing gifts to courtiers, or by seeking to appear in a stately fashion before the emperor. 55 How different was the situation when Ketelaar made his appearance in Lahore some eight decades later: Ketelaar's embassy to the courts of first Bahadur Shah (r. 1707-12) and then Jahandar Shah (r. 1712-13) was both the last and the most splendid of Dutch missions to the central Mughal court. Spanning exactly two years, it involved an entourage consisting of forty European staff with their Indian servants, and a military escort of well over 200 Indian soldiers. 56 The quintessential example of high-profile diplomacy carried out under Company auspices, Ketelaar's embassy carried a price tag of 1,201,495 guilders, half of which was spent on gifts. This was the most expensive diplomatic mission the VOC ever sent to any Asian ruler. 57 Yet these two delegations at opposite ends of the spectrumand the many diplomatic assignments located on the continuum between themhad three crucial facets in common. Their common objective was to petition the emperor for favourable decrees; they relied on Mughal patronage to do so; and they performed symbolic submission to imperial authority in order to achieve their aims. 64 In soliciting new privileges or lobbying for the redress of perceived wrongs, these Company representatives made use of similar channels and procedures as Mughal subjects. 65 They implored the emperor to discipline his officials, entreated him to grant securities 'for our free and peaceable living and that wee may not bee injured in our persons or estates', or sought to be pardoned for offences committed against his subjects. 66 As time progressed, petitions also increasingly featured "domestic" political requests such as 'that his Majesty will be graciously pleased as a Mark of his Royall favour to bestow' revenue collection rights over Indian villages. 67 Performing a role mirroring that of Indian vakils (agents, attorneys), the Companies' merchant-envoys hence emerge less as actors in foreign relations than as spokesmen of interest groups operating within the Mughal imperial system. 68 Like the EIC, the VOC also regularly made use of small-scale petitioning at the central court. The little-known activities of Wouter Heuten (1621), Hendrick Arentsz. Vapour advance their commercial interests and guarantee a supply of exclusive luxury items for personal use or to offer to their superiors, thus helping them raise their profile at court. 71 The imperial administration also took an official interest in cross-cultural advocacy arrangements.
Although marked by recurrent tension, these arrangements provided a functional institutional provision for dealing with foreign petitioners and tended to be remarkably long-standing. In 1616, Roe remarked that Asaf Khan, elder brother to Queen Nur Jahan and father of Shah Jahan's wife Mumtaz Mahal, was 'appoynted sollicitor for our Nation, soe that I can doe nothing without him'. 72 Twenty years later, Drake's (unsuccessful) lobby still relied chiefly on the intercession of Asaf Khan, whom, notwithstanding several acrimonious disputes, was also by the Dutch described as 'a friend and great advocate (voorstaender) of our nation'. 73 In other cases, patronage was transmitted along family or factional lines. From the 1630s through to the 1660s, prominent contacts of the VOC included Asalat Khan, his younger brother, Khalillulah Khan, and the former's sons, Iftikhar Khan and Multafat Khan. 74 DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 16 The Company also received ample assistance from Haqiqat Khan, the diwan (fiscal officer) of the emperor's eldest daughter, Jahanara Begum. 75 Jahanara's concern with the Dutch stemmed from the fact that, in the mid-seventeenth century, she controlled the revenues of the port of Surat, and hence took a direct interest in maritime trade. Besides Haqiqat Khan and the princess herself, Jahanara's former wet nurse, Huri Khanam, also took an active role in communications with VOC representatives. 76 Hindu, Muslim, and Armenian vakils as diplomatic agents in their own right, above all at the courts of the Hindu and Muslim rulers in southern India but also regularly at the Mughal court. The use of Brahmin mediators in South Indian diplomacy was a means of accommodating cultural difference, as they enjoyed freer access to local Hindu elites than was allowed to European outsiders. 81 While the Companies' use of Indian diplomatic agents in Mughal domains was less extensive, in 1669 the English factors in Surat did argue that to prevent extortions from Mughal officials 'noe way was deemed more suteable and effectuall' than to keep a Hindu vakil 'constantly at court'. 82 Such brokers were seen as ideally-suited for handling matters discreetly and in a costeffective manner. In 1660, while the Surat factors were mulling over the choice of 'a judicious person to goe up to court to congratulate the new King', they decided in the meantime to dispatch 'a Bannian, to acquaint King Orange Zeeb with our aggreivances' against the Mughal viceroy of Bengal. 83 Seven years later, an Indian agent dispatched to Delhi to petition the imperial wazir succeeded in obtaining a farman confirming the reduction of customs duties payable by the EIC in Surat. 84 And in 1687, the English entrusted the weighty business of procuring a farman to their Armenian vakil, Khwaja Abnus, after the previous efforts of 'Mahomed Hurriff the Bengall Vakeil att the Mogulls Camp' had proved ineffective. 85 Financial reasons motivated the Madras Council to refrain from sending two of their own number to Aurangzeb's court, just as considerations of costs had prompted the Company to decide against sending an English envoy to Delhi in the 1660s. 86 Even so, the local EIC officials also agreed that Abnus was the right man for the job because he had been recommended by the Mughal governor of Golkonda, Mahabat Khan. Acquiring the backing of imperial officials was paramount, as the Dutch director and Council in Surat likewise concluded in 1700 when desperately seeking to annul the agreement (muchalka) they had been forced to sign which held them liable to compensate Indian merchants for losses due to piracy. Citing their brokers' extensive contacts at court, Hendrick Zwaardecroon and his colleagues authorized the brothers Bhagwandas and Raksikadas to conduct the negotiations. 87 The importance of agents possessing local knowledge when conducting diplomacy in a foreign environment was undisputed, yet the question to what extent one should entrust this delicate business to outsiders remained a matter of debate. Answers varied according to the circumstances of each case, yet always involved considerations of costs, reputation, and trust.
The latter was connected to the issue of perceived loyalty, which itself was clad in cultural assumptions. Although Zwaardecroon chose to rely on Bhagwandas and Raksikadas, he noted that there was room to question their professed allegiance 'when one considers their greedy nature, with which all natives, whether provided with money or not, are ordinarily impregnated'. 88 A Company envoy who expressed a clear-cut preference for employing European rather than Indian representatives was Ketelaar. In 1713 he informed the VOC's Governor-General that several Mughal noblemen had recommended him to maintain an agent at the imperial court, yet that to appoint a 'native' (inlander) he deemed inadvisable: 'such a man at all times would pursue his own advantage more than his masters' interest, whereas of in great credit and respected there by most of the nobles, through whose means there was hopes of obtaining the like privilledges that the Dutch had lately graunted them after so vast an expence'. 93 The scenario was strikingly familiar. In 1677, when commissioning Bacherus to proceed to Delhi, the director of Dutch trade in Surat procured a letter of recommendation from the local Mughal governor (mutasaddi), Ghiyasuddin Khan, addressed to the latter's brother who was in charge of handling petitions at Aurangzeb's court. Bacherus also paid a visit to the subahdar of Gujarat, Muhammad Amin Khan, to solicit letters of support addressed to the imperial wazir and other noblemen. 94 Naturally, assistance of this kind had its price, as the Companies' requests for exemption from customs duties, road tolls, and other charges competed with the interests of local merchants and tax collectors. When Zwaardecroon was preparing his petition to the imperial court, in June 1700, he spent several weeks negotiating with Surat's mutasaddi, Diyanat Khan, again in order to procure a cover letter to an influential brother at court, this time to Arshad Khan who worked as the wazir's deputy. Both parties eventually agreed that the governor would write the letter in return for a gift of 1,000 mohurs (gold coins) to himself, 3,000 rupees to his son, and smaller sums to several of his staff. Local diplomatic events such as these are particularly revealing of the central significance of seemingly minor actors in shaping the course of Mughal-European relations. From the dense chain of mediation that shaped the latter case, it was the eunuch of Diyanat Khan, a man called Mia Ambar, who emerged as the key mover. Consequently, it was Mia Ambar at whom Dutch efforts to obtain political favour were principally directed. 95 In yet other cases, settlements reached between the Companies and local officials were arguably more decisive than their formal authorisation by the central government. When Tack's mission to Shah Jahan's court in 1648 had not brought the result the VOC desired, the Company decided to arrest Mughal shipping in an attempt to obtain redress for a number of grievances. This version of gunboat diplomacy proved fruitful, and in September 1649 a list of proposed articles was approved by Surat's mutasaddi, Mir Musa, who wrote to the emperor recommending their endorsement. 96 A similar deal was brokered at the conclusion of the so-called Anglo-Mughal War of 1686-90, when the EIC agents in western India and the Mughal governor of Surat agreed that both parties would restore or pay compensation for any assets that had been seized. The arrangement had been reached following extensive meetings in the summer of 1689 between George Weldon and Abraham Navarro on the English side, and Qazi Ibrahim and Mir Nizam on that of Surat. 97 Weldon and Navarro's embassy to Aurangzeb's court subsequently brought the conflict to a formal close, yet the most crucial steps had already been taken through successful local diplomacy.
Finally, perhaps the greatest part of provincial diplomacy was geared towards localized arrangements and relationships. In the eastern provinces of Orissa and Bengal, early English and Dutch diplomatic efforts were aimed at securing trading rights within these respective districts, as was the case with Ralph Cartwright's mission to the provincial court in Cuttack in 1633, and Jacob Mahuysen's audience with subahdar Islam Khan in Dhaka in 1636. 98 In later years, Company representatives most commonly travelled to provincial capitals to complain about local officials' non-compliance with existing privileges and to request fresh decrees, as Louis Junius and James Bridgman did when attending Prince Shah Shuja's court in Rajmahal, in 1650 and 1651 respectively. 99 Other instances of provincial diplomacy focused on welcoming the incoming governor (as with William Blake's visit to Shaista Khan in 1664); settling local disputes (the reason for Pieter Hofmeester's mission to Dhaka in 1672); or maintaining relations through the periodic presentation of gifts (which provincial officials in Dhaka, Kasimbazar, Patna and elsewhere expected from the VOC at least once every two years). 100 Vice versa, Mughal governors summoned Company agents to their presence or dispatched messages to them when they sought material or military support. The best-known instance is Shaista Khan's military campaign against Arakan of 1665, for which the viceroy demanded men and ships from the Dutch and English. In an unprecedented move, the Mughal subahdar even sent two envoys to Batavia to acquire the desired assistance, a unique occurrence in a diplomatic relationship characterized by the lack of reciprocal exchange. 101 Besides differences of scale and degrees of formality, in their ceremonial form diplomatic encounters at regional seats of power were analogous to those at the central court.
Mughal imperial symbols and languages of political authority were used throughout the empire, and Mughal princes and high noblemen modelled their personal courts on that of the DIPLOMATIC REPERTOIRES 23 emperor. 102 Consequently, courtly audiences in Bengal and other provincial sites bore the usual marks of Mughal sovereignty, including the presentation of nazr and the donning of khil'at. That said, the smaller scale at which these interactions played out allowed for greater proximity between hosts and visitors. For instance, during his attendance at Shaista Khan's court in Dhaka in 1682, the English agent William Hedges had multiple opportunities to directly converse with the subahdar and the provincial diwan. 103 Such direct, personal contacts between Mughal officials and Company representatives were most common at the port town level, where political and social interactions took place on an everyday basis. Local diplomacy hence also had a communal side to it, for instance in the form of the banquet hosted by the mutasaddi of Surat for 'all the eminent men in Towne', at which the Dutch and English merchants publicly reconciled their differences with the Mughal harbour-master. 104 From the perspective of the EIC and VOC, to prevent disputes from happening at the local level was preferable over the cure of soliciting the emperor. 105 The latter option was deemed exceedingly costly, but more importantly still, the implementation of imperial decrees depended strongly on the cooperation of administrators on the ground. The gradual turn-away of both Companies from central diplomacy toward a focus on maintaining functional relations with provincial and local power-holders thus also serves as a reminder of the agency and autonomy of the latter, who strategically employed their positions of influence to benefit from the European presence. 
